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INTRODUCTION 
No documents are more fundamental to the litigation process than the damages 
documents which must be disclosed as part of any litigant's Initial Disclosures, pursuant to 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). These documents must be provided to the other parties "without 
awaiting a discovery request." IcL With respect to damages, Initial Disclosures must contain 
"all discoverable documents... on which [that party's damage] calculation is based." UTAH 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C). These obligations are designed to allow the parties "to evaluate the 
case early in the process." UTAH R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes. Similarly, a 
payment bond claimant should produce damage documents, as part of its Initial Disclosures, 
which will necessarily consist of an accounting of what has been paid and what is still due, 
including such documents as copies of all the checks received as payment for the project 
against which it is making a claim, and documents that show how those checks were applied. 
Appellant SFR, Inc., d/b/a QED ("QED") wants this Court to hold that a bond 
claimant that: (1) produces no documents during Initial Disclosures; (2) represents in 
response to discovery requests that there are no documents that support its damage claims; 
(3) produces a self-selected group of damage documents on the eve of trial (including many 
of the checks it received for the project)1; and (4) continues to withhold the full set of 
^ED's suggestion that, "It is not clear whether or not the Remittance Documents 
[QED's term for the Damage Documents] were produced or made available for inspection 
to counsel or the parties during the discovery process," (Brief of Appellee at 5, n. 3) is flatly 
contradicted by the Record. Comtrol's Opening Brief affirmatively demonstrates, at Facts 
9 - 22, that the documents were not produced until November 21, 2005, despite a written 
request from Comtrol's counsel that copies of all documents be provided. Fact 16. 
damage documents (including at least three checks of unknown amounts)"; should not have 
its case dismissed because such behavior has no prejudicial effect on its adversary. 
Such a holding would render Rule 26 meaningless and will result in this case standing 
for the proposition that parties can disregard Rule 26 with impunity, without fear of any real 
negative consequence. Cf, Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc.. 427 U.S. 639, 
643 (1976) (finding dismissal an appropriate discovery sanction because "other parties to 
other lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout 
other discovery orders of other district courts."); Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel 
Employees and Restaurant Employees Int'l Union. 212 F.R.D. 178, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
("unless Rule 37 is perceived as a credible deterrent rather than a 'paper tiger,' the pretrial 
quagmire threatens to engulf the entire litigative process."). This Court should not create 
such a precedent. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S SANCTION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE HARM 
CAUSED BY QED. 
A. Appellants Preserved this Issue for Appeal. 
It is not an overstatement that the most relevant documents in a payment bond case are 
the documents that show what a supplier has been paid by its subcontractor. This is 
particularly important when the subcontractor has multiple accounts with the supplier on 
2QED makes the claim that Appellants have "not proved that additional documents 
exist." Brief of Appellee at 10. To the contrary, Appellants' Brief identified three checks 
which QED never produced, and allocation documents for those checks (Appellant's Brief 
at Fact 25). QED's brief does not contain a single fact that would rebut the existence of these 
documents. 
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separate, unrelated projects and the subcontractor has instructed the supplier how to apply 
the payments among the various projects. When QED, after years of contending it did not 
have copies of the checks and payment allocation instructions from Atlas, produced those 
and other damage documents on the eve of trial, Appellants moved to dismiss. Appellants 
contend that QED's late production of these documents had prevented Appellants from 
adequately developing their case via the discovery process, foreclosing "any reasonable 
analysis of Plaintiff s claims that it had provided materials for which it was not paid." R-642. 
Appellants set forth additional discovery needs that were raised by the 11th Hour Documents, 
including follow-up written discovery, depositions of the authors of the documents, expert 
damage witnesses, and review of QED's computer system. R-641-42. QED's 11th Hour 
production of such Damage Documents denied Appellants any meaningful opportunity of 
proving that QED had been paid in full and QED failed to follow Atlas' payment instructions. 
After trial, when Appellants had adequate time to cross-reference and sift through the 
mountain of information contained in the 11th Hour documents, it became apparent from 
closer scrutiny of QED's belated production that at least three checks from Atlas, of 
unknown amounts, had never been produced. In other words, Appellants were correct in 
their pretrial motion to dismiss QED's complaint, which asserted that Appellants were 
severely prejudiced because the 11th Hour documents established that QED did not account 
for all of the monies it received as payment on the account relating to the Matheson Junior 
High Project. By producing the documents at the last minute, QED prevented Appellants 
from conducting the necessary discovery which would show serious questions about QED's 
3 
damage claims. 
QED now contends that Appellants did not adequately preserve the issue of the failure 
to produce the three checks. In QED's world, litigants can, at the last minute, overwhelm 
their opponents with critical documents on the eve of trial, and shift the burden of rapidly 
digesting the documents and finding the few buried nuggets of useful information contained 
therein to the besieged, who are also busily engaged in trying to prepare for trial based on 
those documents produced legitimately during the discovery process. According to QED, 
if the party from whom the information was wrongfully withheld fails to find all of the 
evidentiary "needles in the haystack" of belated documents and articulate their existence with 
precision to the trial court, but only generally asserts that the case should be dismissed for 
discovery violations, the issue has not been preserved for appeal. 
This is not the law. All that is required to preserve an issue for appeal is that the issue 
be "sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court...." State v. Richins. 
86 P.3d 759 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). By their Motion to Dismiss, Appellants raised the belated 
production to the Trial Court's consciousness, asserted that the failure to produce these 
documents earlier had prevented adequate preparation for trial, and set forth additional 
discovery needs raised by the documents. That Appellants' concerns proved prescient after 
additional scrutiny is further basis for reversal of the Trial Court, not a basis for a finding that 
Appellants did not adequately preserve the issue. 
B. Discovery Sanctions Must Cure the Harm Caused by the Discovery 
Violation at Issue, 
A discovery sanction is only adequate to the extent it cures the harm caused by the 
4 
discovery violation.3 See, e.g., Jackson v. Microsoft Corp.. 211 F.R.D. 423, 431-33 (W.D. 
Wash. 2002) (considering the risk of prejudice to defendant caused by discovery misconduct 
and concluding that "dismissal is the only viable remedy."). In cases where documents 
fundamental to a defendant's development of the case have been withheld, dismissal is the 
only adequate sanction that will remedy the harm suffered by the defendant. See, Metro. 
Opera, 212 F.R.D. at 230 (concluding that lesser sanction was not warranted where 
documents had not been produced because "it is impossible to know what [Defendant] would 
have found if [Plaintiff] and its counsel had complied with their discovery obligations from 
the commencement of the action."). 
This is especially true where the documents are damage-related. See, Handwerkerv. 
AT&T Corp.. 211 F.R.D. 203, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing plaintiffs case for failure 
to produce documents that "impact materially on the extent of any damages [plaintiff] claims 
to have suffered" and concluding that "precluding [plaintiff] from introducing evidence [will 
not] provide an effective remedy because the misconduct at issue is [plaintiffs] self-serving 
withholding of information that may assist [defendant in] preparing] its case."). 
In such cases, there is no meaningful argument that a Defendant has not been 
prejudiced. Id. at 210 (concluding that prejudice occurred where plaintiff prevented 
defendant from obtaining damage information, and thereby "hindered [defendant] in 
3To the extent Appellants must identify an error of law in the trial court's ruling (See, 
Brief of Appellee at 13), it is this: As a matter of law, a trial court abuses its discretion when 
the discovery sanction it awards does not cure the harm caused by the discovery violation that 
is at issue, particularly a violation of such a fundamental duty. 
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defending itself"); Metro. Opera, 212 F.R.D. at 229 (dismissing contention that discovery 
violations had not prejudiced defendant where defendant "was not only denied the 
opportunity to prove its case, but was denied the opportunity to plan its strategy in an 
organized fashion as the case proceeded."). 
Because of QED's non-production of the damage documents, Appellants could not 
prove what QED had been paid by Atlas.4 Appellants suspected that QED had been paid in-
full inasmuch as Comtrol had over-paid Atlas. Appellant's Brief at Fact 8. Having been 
prevented by QED from obtaining this information, Appellants lacked any means of 
defending against QED's claims of non-payment. QED's discovery violations deprived 
Appellants of the most fundamental of rights-the right to prepare a defense. Because the 
Trial Court failed to award a discovery sanction that even remotely addressed the harm 
caused by QED, it abused its discretion. The Trial Court's denial of Appellants' Motion to 
Dismiss must be reversed. 
C. This Court Should Reject QED's Attempt to Shift Blame for the 
Consequences of its Discovery Violations to Appellants. 
QED fails to acknowledge the severity of its wrongdoing, but instead attempts to 
absolve itself by pointing to certain "strategic decisions" QED claims Appellants' counsel 
4QED argues that it met its burden of showing that it had not been paid, even without 
the 11th Hour documents. See, Brief of Appellee at 18. However, it did this by refusing to 
produce those documents that would allow Appellants to provide any rebuttal to the simple 
assertion "We have not been paid." The vast majority of plaintiffs could meet their burdens 
if they were allowed to foreclose any meaningful defense by withholding material documents 
showing that they had been paid more than they admit. 
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made in litigating this case that somehow cleanse QED's belated production of all wrong. 
According to QED, Appellants should have: (1) sought a continuance (Brief of Appellee at 
16); (2) filed motions to compel production of the documents (Id.); (3) sought production of 
documents from Atlas (Brief of Appellee at 19); and (4) focused more on trial preparation 
and not on the contents of the 11th Hour documents (Brief of Appellee at 20). None of these 
suggested reasons to ignore QED's discovery violations withstand scrutiny. 
Rule 37 does not require a party seeking dismissal to also request a continuance. 
Appellants moved for dismissal, a remedy that would have adequately addressed the harm 
QED caused. To the extent QED thought continuance was more appropriate than dismissal, 
the burden was on QED to so argue. QED did not; instead it argued that its belated 
production had caused no harm whatsoever. R-2224, pg. 28. 11. 2-4. Nothing in the Rules 
of Civil Procedure requires parties harmed by nondisclosure of documents to present the 
Trial Court with a full array of sanctions to preserve the right to appeal failure to dismiss. 
Nor should a party harmed by discovery violations be blamed for the failure to file a 
motion to compel when the opposing party has represented that the documents in question 
do not exist by stating in writing, signed by both QED's Credit Manager and QED's legal 
counsel, that all the relevant documents had been produced.5 R-670-71, 672. The 
requirement of the filing of a "Motion to Compel Production of Non-Existent Documents" 
5QED admits that Appellants would have prevailed on a Motion to Compel (Brief of 
Appellee at 16), but omits the implications of this admission for an analysis of its 
wrongdoing. 
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as a prerequisite to dismissal when those same documents later appear would serve little 
purpose. 
It is similarly wrong to suggest that Appellants' failure to obtain the documents from 
Atlas bars this appeal. Atlas had gone out of business and the location of its principals who 
had left the State of Utah (and any documents they may have had), was unknown. Moreover, 
the obligations Rule 26 imposes on litigants are independent of the existence of other sources 
of information. A party that violates Rule 26 cannot point to other sources of discovery as 
an excuse for its noncompliance with the rule. The suggestion that the records could have 
been obtained from Atlas is questionable, given that Atlas' owner, Mr. Soofi, went bankrupt 
early in these proceedings (R-88-89), and QED has a default judgment (R-98-100) against 
Atlas that it has not collected. If obtaining information from Atlas is such a simple process, 
why did QED not collect its judgment from Atlas? 
Finally, the suggestion that Appellants' counsel should not have spent any time 
analyzing the belatedly-produced documents overlooks the fact that the issue of the 
appropriate sanction was not finally resolved until the morning of trial. Given this fact, it 
would have been negligent to ignore the belated production. QED successfully diverted 
counsel's attention at a time when Appellants most needed it, which only serves to highlight 
the palpable prejudice to Appellants caused by QED. 
II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, QED IS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPOUNDED 
EIGHTEEN PERCENT INTEREST. 
A. The Plain Language of the Statue Excludes Prejudgment Interest. 
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QED contends that the payment bond statute provides an unambiguous right to 18% 
prejudgment interest. Brief of Appellee at 20. However, the word "interest" appears 
nowhere in the statute.6 Rather, the statute provides "a right of action" "for any unpaid 
amount due" one who has "furnished labor, service, or equipment" to state construction 
projects. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-504(4)(a). Read in harmony, these phrases make clear 
.that bond claimants are to be compensated for the value they provide to the project. Because 
labor, service and equipment all add value to a project, bond claimants are entitled to the 
"unpaid amount" for the labor, service, or equipment they provided. Interest, in contrast, 
does not add value to a project, and is therefore not part of the "unpaid amount" for which 
a bond claimant has a right of action. 
At least one other jurisdiction interpreting similar language has reached the same 
conclusion. See, e.g., R.W. Sidlev. Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.. 319 F.Supp.2d 554,558-59 
(W.D. Pa. 2004) (disallowing prejudgment interest despite bond that allowed claimant to 
recover for "such sum or sums as may be justly due him"). 
B. The Prejudgment Interest Award is Punitive. 
QED fails to provide any meaningful argument addressing the fact that an award of 
18% prejudgment interest in a noncontractual setting is punitive under the newly clarified 
6In contrast, the statute explicitly provides for the recovery of attorneys fees. Under 
the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of 
one thing implies the exclusion of another"), a reasonable conclusion arising from the 
omission of any mention of prejudgment interest is that the legislature did not intend for 
suppliers to recover prejudgment interest, in addition to attorneys' fees. See, e.g.. Field v. 
Bover Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) (applying maxim to interpret statute). 
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decision of Wilcox v. Anchor Wate. -P.3d -, 2007 UT 39 (Utah 2007). QED rightly points 
out that Wilcox concerns an insurance liquidation preference action, not a payment bond 
claim. Brief of Appellee at 25. Preference claims are in many respects, however, very 
similar to payment bond claims. Both typically arise only in light of insolvency; both are 
designed to protect parties that may be harmed by insolvency; and both often involve 
defendants that (like Appellants here) are completely innocent of any wrongdoing. If 10% 
prejudgment interest was deemed punitive by the Wilcox court when awarded against an 
innocent preference defendant, 2007 UT 39 at 148, there can be no principled basis for the 
argument that 18% prejudgment interest is anything but punitive here. 
C. QED Admits that the Trial Court Awarded Compound Interest. 
The rule in Utah is that "interest on a judgment should be calculated simply unless 
agreed to otherwise by the parties." City of Hildale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d697, 707 (Utah 2001). 
However, the Trial Court awarded QED 18% postjudgment interest on the prejudgment 
interest portion of the judgment. QED argues that the interest award has not been 
"compounded in the way that [Appellants] suggest" impliedly admitting that it has been 
compounded in some other way. In order to comply with Utah's prohibition against 
compound interest absent agreement between the parties, the judgment cannot award 
postjudgment interest on the prejudgment interest portion of the judgment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S JOINT CHECK ESTOPPEL RULING SHOULD NOT 
BE DISTURBED. 
In considering whether to adopt the Joint Check Rule, the Trial Court recognized that 
10 
it is "a good principle," but indicated that it was reluctant to adopt the Joint Check Rule 
absent guidance from a Utah appellate court. R-2224 at 45-46. This Court should provide 
that guidance. The Trial Court's ruling is, in effect, an adoption of the Joint Check Rule, 
which is itself a context-specific form of estoppel. For all the important policy reasons 
underlying the Joint Check Rule, this Court should both adopt the Joint Check Rule and 
uphold the Trial Court's estoppel ruling. 
A. Facts Relevant to the Estoppel Ruling. 
The $94.116.55 Joint Check 
On October 5, 2001, Comtrol issued a joint check to QED and Atlas for $94,116.55. 
D. Ex. 13. The check consisted of $7,585.00 for July invoices and $12,787.00 for August 
invoices as well as $73,744.55 for September fixtures invoices, which amounts were 
ascertained in telephone conversations with QED. R-2222 at 569, 11. 5 - 16; D. Ex. 33. 
Comtrol learned later that Atlas deposited the $94,116.55 check into its own bank account 
without QED's endorsement. R-2222 at 576,11. 6 - 9. On November 9,2001, Comtrol called 
QED to ascertain whether QED had received any of the funds from the $94,116.55 joint 
check. R-2222 at 576,11. 10 - 23; R-2222 at 577,1. 21 - 578,1. 6. Comtrol then contacted 
Atlas to ascertain why QED had not received the check. R-2222 at 579,1. 4 - 21. Comtrol 
informed Mr. Dahl at QED that Atlas' secretary had deposited the check directly into Atlas' 
account. R-2222 at 583,11. 20-23. 
Comtrol's Efforts to Communicate with QED re: Atlas' Account Balance 
11 
Prior to paying Atlas, Comtrol regularly called QED to ascertain the balance of QED' s 
account with Atlas. R-2220 at 199 - 201. QED responded immediately to those inquiries. 
R-2220 at 201,11. 3 - 19. QED had a "hundred percent" understanding that Comtrol was 
relying on QED to give adequate information regarding balances. R-2220 at 201,11.20 - 24. 
On November 13, 2001 (R-2222 at 585, 11. 16 - 21), Brian Burk of Comtrol called 
QED's Branch Manager, David Dahl, to inquire about the status of QED's account with 
Atlas on the Matheson Project. Mr. Burk stated that the Atlas draw for that month was 
$85,000, and Mr. Dahl indicated that the amounts owed by Atlas to QED exceeded that 
amount. R-2222 at 583, 1. 7 - 584, 1. 18. Mr. Burk informed Mr. Dahl that because the 
amount due to QED exceeded the amount due to Atlas, the full amount of the Atlas draw 
would be paid by joint check to QED and Atlas. R-2222 at 584,1. 19 - 585,1.1. Mr. Dahl 
did not object to Comtrol's joint check proposal. R-2222 at 585,11. 2 - 4 . 
QED Endorses the $85383.19 Joint Check to Atlas 
On November 13, 2001, Comtrol issued a joint check to Atlas and QED in the sum 
of $85,383.19. D.Ex. 15. Azam Soofi and Alan Hall of Atlas both came to Comtrol's office 
to pick up the joint check. R-2222 at 587,11. 3-12. Mr. Burk indicated to Mr. Soofi and Mr. 
Hall that the check was written joint because he had learned from Mr. Dahl that QED was 
owed more than $85,000. R-2222 at 589,11.2 - 5. In response, Mr. Dahl and Mr. Soofi grew 
loud and gave Mr. Burk to understand that they did not want a joint check. R-2222 at 589. 
Nonetheless, Atlas took the joint check to QED's office for endorsement. R-2220 at 
203,1. Mr. Dahl endorsed the check on behalf of QED, intending to endorse it over to Atlas. 
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R-2220 at 202,1. 21 - 203,1. 9. Mr. Dahl's endorsement of the check occurred no later than 
November 14, 2001. R-2220 at 206, 11. 3 - 51. At the time QED endorsed the check, 
$111,305.19 in invoices were owed to QED for the Matheson Project, with dates ranging 
from October 2 to November 19, 2001. D. Ex. 38. In exchange for QED's endorsement, 
Atlas paid QED a smaller check for $51,123.76. D. Ex. 14; R-2220 at 203,11. 10 - 12; R-
2220 at 204,11. 17 -19. However, the date of the smaller check was never disclosed (another 
check QED failed to produce). Moreover, the smaller check was not deposited into QED's 
bank account until November 19, 2001. R-2220 at 206,1. 12 - 207,1. 8. QED never told 
Comtrol about the smaller check. R-2221 at 298 1. 24 - 299, 1. 4. Based on earlier 
conversations with Mr. Dahl, Mr. Burk was shocked to learn that QED had endorsed the joint 
check to Atlas, instead of keeping the entire amount. R-2222 at 589,1. 20 - 590,1. 5. 
Course of Dealings re: Net-30 
QED accepts early payments from customers, and considers those customers who pay 
early to be "great customers." R-2220 at 220,11. 11 - 16. Atlas regularly paid QED invoices 
on dates preceding the last day of the month after the invoice was issued.7 In the electrical 
supply industry, industry standards allow an electrical contractor to pay an invoice before it 
becomes overdue; suppliers do not refuse such payments. R-2223 at 673,1. 2 - 674,1. 3. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Applied the Principals Embodied in the Joint 
Check Rule. 
7See, e ^ , P. Ex. 7 at QED 0275, 0277, 0282, 0287, and 0293, each of which is a 
September invoice, and each of which shows payment on October 12, 2001, well before the 
October 31, 2001 due date. 
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The Joint Check Rule has found such wide acceptance that "every state that has 
considered the issue has adopted [it]." Henry Products Inc. v. Tarmu, 967 P.2d 444, 446 
(Nev. 1998).8 The rule holds that because joint checks are used to protect suppliers by 
ensuring payment, where a supplier elects to jeopardize this protection by endorsing a joint 
check without retaining sufficient proceeds to satisfy the debt owed him by the subcontractor, 
"the material supplier should bear the risk of its own decision." Brown Wholesale Elec. Co. 
v. Betzak of Scottsdale. Inc., 774 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Post Bros. Constr. 
Co. v. Yoder. 20 Cal.3d 1, 6 (Cal. 1977) (M[T]he materialman's failure to determine the 
owner's or contractor's intention as to the application of funds represented by the joint check 
precludes urging the loss caused by his imprudence should be borne by the owner or general 
contractor."). Although there are any number of reasons why a supplier may elect to release 
the funds to the subcontractor (the subcontractor may be cash poor, or the supplier may wish 
to maintain good relations with its customer by advancing credit), to the extent that it chooses 
to do so, the supplier is literally gambling with the money of the general contractor and the 
surety. The general contractor and the surety have no means of influencing what is 
essentially a purely business decision conducted at arm's length between two remote parties, 
8See, e^ , Brown Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Beztak of Scottsdale. Inc.. 788 P.2d 73, 76 (Ariz. 
1990); Post Bros. Constr. Co. v. Yoder. 20 Cal.3d 1, 3 (1977); Iowa Supply Co. v. Grooms & Co. 
Constr.. Inc.. 428 N. W.2d 662,666 (Iowa 1988); Anchor Concrete Co. v. Victor Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 
664 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla.1983); Medford School Dist. ex rel. North Coast Elec. Co. v. Peterson & 
Jones Commercial Constr., Inc.. 708 P.2d 623, 626 (Or. 1985); City Lumber Co. v. National Surety 
Corp.. 92 S.E.2d 128,131 (S.C. 1956); F. & C. Eng'g Co. v. Moore. 300 S.W.2d 323,326- 27 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1957); Dauphin v. Smith.713 P.2d 116, 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
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and should not suffer because the supplier's decision turns out to be the wrong choice. See, 
id ; City Lumber Co. v. Nat'l Sur. Corp.. 92 S.E.2d 128, 131 (stating, with respect to a 
materialman's desire to maintain relationship with subcontractor, that "...such considerations 
cannot be allowed to penalize the prime contractor and its surety."). 
The joint check decisions focus on the expected business sophistication of suppliers, 
and their corresponding knowledge of potential harm to the general contractor and surety if 
the funds from a joint check are misused: 
As an experienced business man, respondent's manager was bound to have 
known, without being specifically so advised, that he was expected to collect 
respondent's account from the proceeds of the [joint] check. 
The surety was equitably entitled to have the check applied to the discharge of 
the debts for which it was bound, but this was not done because of the 
negligence of respondent in empowering [the subcontractor] to use the funds 
for any purpose which he desired. This is not a case of non-action on the part 
of [the materialman], but positive and affirmative action injuriously affecting 
the surety. 
Id. These same concerns are present with respect to the joint checks issued by Comtrol and 
endorsed by QED. QED's experienced managers knew, and were, in fact, advised by 
Comtrol, that they were expected to collect Atlas' account from the proceeds of the joint 
check. Thus, Appellants are equitably entitled to have the joint check applied to the 
discharge of the debts for which they are liable. 
The policies behind the Joint Check Rule are in play here. QED knew when it 
endorsed the $85,383.19 joint check that Atlas had improperly deposited the $94,116.55 
October 5,2001 joint check without QED's endorsement and that Atlas owed it $112,311.97 
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for the job. QED could have insisted on receipt of the entire $85,383.19 by withholding its 
endorsement. Instead, for whatever reason, it did not, and chose to gamble with Appellants' 
money. Pursuant to the Joint Check Rule, the risk of this reckless decision must be borne by 
QED, and not by the innocent Appellants. The Trial Court's ruling should not be disturbed. 
C. QED Failed to Marshall all Evidence Supporting the Estoppel Ruling. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party challenging 
a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." To 
fulfill its duty to marshall, QED was required to, 
"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's 
position"; [they] must play the "devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must 
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt 
to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case . . . . In sum, to 
properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must demonstrate how the 
court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings 
contradict the clear weight of the evidence. 
United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, et aL 2006 UT 35, 140 
P.3d 1200 (2006). Instead of marshalling the facts supporting the Trial Court's estoppel 
ruling, QED has merely re-argued on appeal the factual case, leaving Appellants and this 
Court "to bear the expense and time of performing the critical task of marshalling the 
evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable." Id. at 1207, f 26. The Utah Supreme 
Court has warned of the "grim consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill the 
marshalling requirement," and that the appellate court "can rely on that failure to affirm the 
lower court's findings of fact." Id. at 1207, f 27. As such, "[a]n appellant may not simply 
cite to the evidence which supports his or her position and hope to prevail." Wavment v. 
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Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1150 (Utah 2006). In other words, 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
QED failed to meet the marshalling standard in setting forth the facts which gave rise 
to the Trial Court's estoppel ruling. QED omitted any mention of the $94,116.55 joint check, 
Comtrol's shock at learning that Atlas had deposited that joint check, and Comtrol's 
subsequent discussions with QED at the time the $85,383.19 check was issued. This factual 
background was important to an understanding of just how brazen QED was in not 
demanding that Atlas pay it all of the $85,383.19 joint check. 
QED then glosses over the evidence regarding Comtrol's efforts to communicate with 
QED about the account balance, mentioning only Mr. Dahl's testimony and Ms. Zobell's 
(Brief at 31), with no mention whatsoever of the detailed testimony of Brian Burk, as set 
forth above. Where QED does cite to Mr. Dahl, it omits his "hundred percent" understanding 
that Comtrol was relying on QED for accurate information regarding QED's account balance 
with Atlas. There is no mention of D. Ex. 38, which sets forth the $111,305.19 in invoices 
that Atlas owed to QED for the Matheson Project on November 19,2001, the date that QED 
endorsed over to Atlas the joint check for $85,383.19. No mention is made of the 
conversation between Mr. Burk and the Atlas representatives who came to Comtrol's office 
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to pick up the $85,383.19 joint check. QED also omits evidence undercutting its strange 
arguments that "net-30" means up to net-60 terms on its account with Atlas, namely: (1) that 
QED accepts early payments from customers, and considers those customers who do pay 
early "great customers"; (2) that Atlas regularly paid QED's invoices on dates that preceded 
the last day of the month following the month during which QED's invoice issued; and (3) 
Brent Burk's testimony that in the electrical supply industry an electrical contractor can pay 
an invoice before it becomes overdue, and suppliers do not refuse such payments. R-2223 
at 673,1.2-674,1.3. 
These omissions show that QED has not marshalled in accordance with Rule 24(a)(9). 
QED has not presented the Court with "every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial" supporting the joint check estoppel ruling, nor a "magnificent array of supporting 
evidence." QED's brief lacks any effort to "temporarily remove [its] own prejudices and 
fully embrace the adversary's position", or play the "devil's advocate." QED's appeal of 
the Trial Court's estoppel ruling must be dismissed for failure to marshall. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Applied General Estoppel Principles. 
Utah's estoppel caselaw is based on the principal that where one of two innocent 
parties must suffer, the loss should fall on the one whose acts have caused the loss. See, G. 
Eugene England Foundation v. Smith's Food King No. 6. 542 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1975); 
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber. 526 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Utah 1974). 
Estoppel requires three elements: (1) a party acts or fails to act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with a subsequent claim, (2) a second party reasonably acts or does not act 
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because of the first party's original act or failure to act, and (3) the second party would suffer 
injury if the first party were allowed to repudiate such act or failure to act. Shaw Resources 
Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C.. 142 P.3d 560, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
Evidence presented at trial met all three of these elements. First, QED acted, or failed 
to act, when it did not object to Comtrol's proposal that the $85,383.19 be paid in the form 
of a joint check. Before paying the joint check, Brian Burk telephoned David Dahl to inform 
him that Atlas' entire payment for that month was being made joint due to Atlas' earlier 
deposit of a large joint check without QED's endorsement. QED thus knew: (1) that Atlas 
had already taken $94,116.55 of its money by depositing an earlier joint check without 
QED's signature; (2) that this had caused great concern on the part of Comtrol; (3) that 
Comtrol wanted to ensure that QED got the entire amount of the next Atlas draw, or 
$85,3 83.19; and (4) that Comtrol intended to accomplish this by paying the full draw amount 
in the form of a joint check. QED failed to tell Comtrol that this amount was not "due," but 
instead confirmed that the outstanding invoices it had issued to Altas exceeded the 
$85,383.19 amount. No mention was made to Comtrol of the net-30 terms or Atlas and 
QED's interpretation of those terms. 
The second element of estoppel is met because Comtrol relied on QED's failure to 
object to the proposed $85,383.19 joint check and did, in fact, issue that check. Upon receipt 
of the check, QED did nothing to indicate to Comtrol that it was defective, too large, too 
small, or had not rendered the account current. Rather, it endorsed the check over to Atlas. 
Having maintained its silence then, QED cannot be heard to complain now. 
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Finally, the third element is met because Comtrol would be damaged if QED were 
allowed to represent that more than $85,383.19 was owed it and then simply endorse the joint 
check over to Atlas with no legal effect. By virtue of basic principles of estoppel and the 
amount owed to QED on November 13, 2001, the Trial Court correctly ruled that QED 
should be deemed to have received the entire $85,383.19 of the joint check and was estopped 
from claiming otherwise. 
It is clear that Atlas owed QED far in excess of the $85,383.19 when it endorsed that 
check. D. Ex. 38. However, QED attempts to manipulate this calculation by arguing that 
certain of the unpaid invoices were not "due" on November 19, 2001. QED's distinction 
between invoices that are "due" and those that are "owing" is based on its interpretation of 
the term "Net 30,M with QED contending that an invoice is not due until the last day of the 
month after it was issued. However, "Net 30" has a legal meaning which is not consistent 
with the interpretation urged by QED, namely that payment of an invoice is not due until 
thirty days after the date of the invoice.9 
9Averv Dennison Corp. v. Home Trust & Savings Bank, 2003 WL 22697175 at 1 
(N.D.Iowa,2003) ("Terms of'net 30 days' means that Group One was allowed 30 days from 
the invoice date to pay that invoice and Group One was not in default on the invoice until 30 
days after the invoice date"); Watson v. Cargill, Inc., Nutrena Div., 573 S.W.2d 35,40 (Tex. 
App. 1978) ("net 30 days" means payment due 30 days after delivery); In re H.L. Hansen 
Lumber Co. of Galesburg, Inc., 270 B.R. 273, 275 (Bkrtcy. CD. 111. 2001) ("The payment 
terms printed on the invoices are "net 30 days," meaning full payment is due within 30 
days."); Valentine v. Patrick Warren Const. Co.. 56 N.W.2d 860,870 (Wis. 1953) (stating that 
contract's "terms were 'net 30 days' meaning that after thirty days the amount of the invoice 
was past due"); cf. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Sonco, Inc., (E.D.Pa April 20, 1983) 
(holding that the term "net thirty (30) days" is not ambiguous, and therefore refusing to take 
parole evidence as to its meaning). 
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QED argues that estoppel cannot be applied because it was "obligated" to allow Atlas 
to keep the $34,259.43. This argument does not comport with the reality of the relationship 
between QED and Atlas. Atlas regularly paid QED's invoices on dates that preceded "the 
last day of the month following the month during which QED's invoice issued." See, e.g., 
P. Ex. 7 at QED 0275, 0277, 0282, 0287, and 0293, each of which is a September invoice, 
and each of which shows payment by Atlas on October 12,2001, well before the October 31, 
2001 due date that QED maintains it is obligated to follow. Consequently, no reasonable 
argument exists that QED was "owed" an amount less than the full value of the $85,383.19 
joint check on the date it was endorsed. 
QED next claims that the record lacks evidence of five necessary elements of 
estoppel. The elements cited are not necessary elements of estoppel, and none of QED's 
asserted deficiencies in the record are sufficient to overturn the Trial Court's ruling. First, 
QED argues that there is no evidence of a misrepresentation on the part of QED. Brief at 34-
35. However, estoppel does not require a misrepresentation. Rather, all that is required 
under Utah law is an act, or failure to act, inconsistent with a future legal position, i.e., not 
objecting to a proposal that Atlas' full draw be paid via joint check, and then claiming a right 
to endorse the joint check over to Atlas and collect only a portion of the balance owed. See, 
e.g.. J.P. Koch. Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co.. Inc.. 534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975) (describing 
equitable estoppel as "a doctrine of equity to prevent one party from deluding or inducing 
another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss" and setting forth the test as 
requiring conduct "by act or omission"). 
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Next, QED argues that it has been consistent in demanding that it be paid in full for 
all materials furnished to the project. Brief at 35-36. This is not true-QED failed to object 
to Comtrol's proposal that it be paid via joint check and then inconsistently endorsed the joint 
check over to Atlas. This is not consistent with a demand to be paid in full. 
Third, QED claims that estoppel cannot be applied because it did not intend its actions 
in endorsing the joint check to be a bar to recovery against the payment bond. Brief at 35, 
37 (citing 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 46). But QED misstates the Am. Jur. 
section on which it relies. That section only requires, as a general matter, that a party to be 
estopped "should have intended, or at least expected" . . . "that his words or conduct would 
be relied upon by others and influence their action." There is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support a finding by the Trial Court that QED's assent to Comtrol's proposal that 
the entire Atlas draw be paid by joint check was intended to induce both payment by Comtrol 
and Comtrol's reliance on QED's best efforts to ensure that it retained the full amount of that 
check. QED's proposed standard, which holds, in effect, that a party can only be estopped 
if it intended to be estopped, would eliminate estoppel from our jurisprudence. 
QED's fourth argument against the application of estoppel is that the Trial Court's 
finding that Comtrol had unreasonably relied on lien waivers executed by QED renders 
estoppel inappropriate. Brief at 38. However, this finding related to lien waivers executed 
much earlier in the Project, for different pay requests. See, D. Ex. 2; D. Ex. 3; R-2225 at 15 -
16 (ruling that reliance on lien release executed on May 4, 2001 was not reasonable). QED 
should not be allowed to hyperbolize a finding that Comtrol's reliance on an earlier release 
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(that is completely unrelated to the Trial Court's estoppel ruling) was unreasonable into a 
finding that all of Comtrol's actions were unreasonable. The Trial Court made no findings 
indicating that Comtrol was unreasonable in its approach to the $85,383.19 joint check. This 
Court should refuse QED's invitation to do so. 
Finally, QED' s fifth reason why estoppel should not be applied is that Comtrol did not 
do all it was entitled to do to "ascertain the exact amount Atlas owed QED" and was 
therefore negligent. Brief at 38. However, Mr. Dahl represented to Mr. Burk that Atlas 
owed QED in excess of $85,383.19. R-2222 at 583,1. 7 - 584, 1. 18. QED suggests that 
Comtrol should "have asked QED to explain Atlas's payment terms." Brief at 38. There is 
nothing unreasonable about relying on Mr. Dahl's representation. QED is apparently 
suggesting that Comtrol should have cross-examined Mr. Dahl about his statement that more 
than $85,383.19 was owed by Atlas. 
In support of its argument, QED cites Syro Steel Co. v. Hubbell Highway Signs, Inc., 
424 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). In that case, a general contractor was not entitled to 
estoppel when the supplier told the general contractor it was "o.k." to pay the subcontractor, 
and the subcontractor subsequently failed to pay the supplier. In this case, Comtrol attempted 
to ensure that QED was paid by informing both Atlas and QED that the check was being 
made joint to ensure payment to QED. No such protections were sought by the general 
contractor in Syro Steel. Comtrol was not negligent, and estoppel is appropriate here. 
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E. The Fact that this is a Payment Bond Case does not Provide QED 
Special Protection Against Estoppel. 
QED argues that estoppel is inappropriate because this case arises in the payment 
bond context, under a statute designed to "protect innocent suppliers." Brief at 39. Indeed, 
urges QED, upholding the Trial Court's estoppel ruling will "eviscerate the purpose of the 
payment bond statute." Id at 40. Affirming the Trial Court will do nothing of the sort. 
While the payment bond statute should be liberally construed, that liberal construction is not 
without limits. See, MacEvov and F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 
U.S. , 107 (noting that while court was mindful of obligation to construe the "highly 
remedial" Miller Act "liberally" . . . "such a salutary policy does not justify . . . imposing 
wholesale liability on payment bonds"); U.S. for Use and Ben, of B & R, Inc. v. Donald Lane 
Const., 19 F.Supp.2d 217,224 (D. Del. 1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized 
the "occasional need to carve out exception[s] to the general rule of liberal construction" of 
the Miller Act). The only result of upholding the Trial Court's estoppel decision is that 
suppliers will be required to be forthright with general contractors about balances on 
accounts with subcontractors. The payment bond statute does not provide suppliers the right 
to lead general contractors astray and then benefit financially from their lack of candor. This 
Court should decline QED's invitation to so hold. 
The caselaw cited by QED for the proposition that estoppel is inappropriate in the 
payment bond context is distinguishable. In CECO Corp v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 
P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court found estoppel inappropriate when a sub-
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subcontractor notifies a general contractor that it will not be necessary to issue joint checks 
because "the sub-subcontractor will continue to look to the subcontractor for payment." Id. 
at 970. QED made no such representation here; rather, it was informed that Comtrol 
intended to ensure that it was paid by joint check. Where the general contractor in CECO 
did nothing to ensure that its subcontractor paid its supplier, Comtrol paid Atlas via joint 
check, with specific instructions to QED and Atlas that the full amount of the check was for 
QED. This distinction renders the holding of CECO inapposite. To hold otherwise would 
deprive general contractors of a well-established, simple, and expedient method for paying 
debts and providing protection to materialmen, the general contractor, and the public 
contracting authority. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE STATUTORY 
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE TO THE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS PORTION OF THE AMENDED JUDGMENT. 
Defendants successfully argued before the Trial Court that the statutory judgment rate 
of 6.37% should be applied to attorneys fees and costs, because those portions of the 
Judgment do not relate to the principal owed on the contract between QED and Atlas. R-
1869-70; R-1905. QED argues that it is entitled to 18% because UTAH CODE ANN. § 
15-1 -4(2)(a) provides that"... a judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the 
contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
15-1 -4(2)(a) (emphasis added). The judgment at issue is not a contract judgment. Appellants 
were not in privity with QED. QED was an electrical supplier for and was in privity with 
only one other party in this case, Atlas, and the judgment on appeal is not against Atlas. 
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Appellants were not involved m the negotiation of the interest rate on QED's sales to Atlas. 
Thus, there is no interest "agreed upon by the parties, and UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-l-4(2)(a) 
does not apply. Instead, the appropriate interest rate is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 
15-l-4(3)(a), which provides that: 
...other civil and criminal judgments of the district court and justice court shall 
bear interest at the federal postjudgment rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 
2%. 
Despite the plain language of the postjudgment interest statute, QED argues that the 
payment bond statute serves to change the effect of that language and requires Comtrol and 
USF&G to swallow whatever interest rate QED and Atlas have agreed to. In so arguing, 
QED overstates the precedential value of Trench Shoring Servs., Inc. v. Saratoga Springs 
Dev., L.L.C., 57 P.3d 241 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) by claiming it is precedent for awarding 
post-judgment interest to suppliers at the contracted interest rate. Brief of Appellee at 40. 
Trench Shoring should not be read to include this Court's precedential blessing of the 
higher rate argued for here by QED. Rather, the only mention of the appropriateness of the 
interest rate in that case is found in a footnote, where this Court explicitly declined to even 
address the interest rate issue: 
Developer additionally argues that the district court erred in awarding 
prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the rental agreement rate, rather than 
the statutory rate, as requested in Supplier's complaint and motion for 
summary judgment.... These issues were not preserved for appeal. Thus we 
decline to consider whether the district court erred in awarding interest 
. . . to Supplier. 
57 P.3d at 244, n.2 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The precedential value of 
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the Trench Shoring case for a determination of the appropriate postjudgment interest rate is 
nil. The payment bond statute should not be read to allow suppliers to foist usurious interest 
rates on parties with whom they are not in privity. Because there is no contract between 
QED and either Comtrol or USF&G, the Trial Court properly awarded QED postjudgment 
interest at the 6.37% rate required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-l-4(3)(a). 
CONCLUSION 
To uphold the Trial Court's failure to dismiss QED's case "would diminish the 
Court's authority and the adversary system and would serve as a license, encouraging similar 
behavior." Metro. Opera, 212 F.R.D. at 231. This Court should reverse the Trial Court's 
Denial of Appellants' Motion to Dismiss QED's complaint for Rule 37 discovery violations 
and remand the case to the Trial Court for an award of Attorneys Fees and Costs to 
Appellants as the prevailing parties under UTAH CODE ANN. §63-56-504(6). 
Additionally, this Court should deny QED's Cross-Appeal, adopt the Joint Check 
Rule, and affirm the Trial Court's decision to estop QED from collecting the $34,259.43 that 
QED squandered when it endorsed the $85,383.19 joint check to Atlas despite Comtrol's 
instruction that the full amount of the check was for QED. 
Respectfully submitted this// day of JuneyZUp7. 
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